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Copyright, Trademark and Secondary Liability After Grokster
Mark Bartholomew*
Not all intellectual property is created equal. Judges may wax rhapsodic about
the creative impulse that generates copyrightable works, but they have not been so
entranced with the advertising acumen needed to develop a compelling trademark.
The difference in judicial attitudes toward copyright and trademarks is most
apparent in the increasingly important arena of secondary infringement doctrine.
Secondary infringement doctrine in both copyright and trademark stems from
the same common law starting points. The use of vicarious and contributory
liability, secondary infringement's two main branches, to impose liability on a
defendant who does not commit the underlying illegal conduct derives from the
laws of tort and of agency. Many courts and commentators have recognized that
secondary infringement law owes its existence to this common law heritage. 
1
Despite recognition of this shared origin, the doctrines have moved in very
different directions, particularly in the last decade. As copyright litigants expanded
their litigation strategy to include online intermediaries, secondary copyright
liability was stretched to encompass a wider array of defendants with increasingly
tangential relationships to the direct infringer. Meanwhile, even though similar
online threats jeopardized the ability of mark holders to safeguard their brands'
goodwill, courts refused to implement a similar expansion for secondary trademark
liability. Instead, for questions of contributory and vicarious trademark
infringement, the courts largely hewed to established doctrine. The result is a
doctrinal split favoring copyright plaintiffs over trademark plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court's last pronouncement on the issue of secondary
infringement, its 2005 decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd,2 did little to bridge the gap between copyright and trademark in this area. In
that case, which involved a distributor of peer-to-peer software used to share both
copyrighted and uncopyrighted music and motion picture files, the Court held that
no safe harbor exists for purveyors of technology with substantial noninfringing
uses when there is "clear expression" of an intent to induce copyright
* Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. The author would like
to thank Doug Smith for excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 435 *1984); Faulkner v. Nat'l
Geographic Soc'y, 211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 472-73 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), modified, 220 F. Supp. 2d 237
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic Enter. Inc., 409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005); Peter S.
Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L. REv. 941, 941 (2007); Alfred C. Yen, Third-
Party Copyright Liability After Grokster, 91 MINN. L. REv. 184, 190 (2006).
2. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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infringement. 3  By creating a new variety of secondary infringement liability,
"active inducement" infringement, the Court effectively punted on the unresolved
issues plaguing vicarious and contributory liability.4  It announced no new
construction of these areas of the law. Nevertheless, in commenting on how its
new "active inducement" type of copyright liability was different from what came
before, the Court may have subtly shifted the traditional calculus employed by
courts in vicarious and contributory copyright infringement cases in a way that
widens the gulf between copyright and trademark.
This Article takes stock of the post-Grokster case law. Cases like Perfect 10 v.
Visa and Tiffany v. eBay show courts struggling with an unruly body of law that
offers little guidance in confronting issues surrounding new technologies that are
capable of facilitating mass infringement of copyrights and trademarks. 5  These
cases also demonstrate that courts are continuing to construe secondary liability law
very differently depending on whether the plaintiff is a copyright owner or a
trademark owner. Although courts appear to be aware of this divergence, they
offer no explanation for it.
The reasons behind the divergence deserve to be explored. Secondary liability
for copyright infringement need not be construed in the same manner as secondary
liability for trademark infringement. 6 Courts should, however, know why they are
construing one body of law in a much more plaintiff-friendly way than another
when both derive from the same common law principles. Sometimes a comparison
of two similar phenomena can bring the differences between them into greater
relief and provoke deeper understanding of their innate characteristics. Part I of
this Article attempts such a comparison, describing recent judicial moves in
vicarious infringement doctrine. Part II performs the same analysis for
contributory infringement. Part III speculates on why courts have been willing to
3. Id. at 936-37.
4. See id. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). There are several unresolved issues in the law of
secondary infringement. Regardless of the intellectual property regime at issue, the standard for
evaluating material contribution is unclear. Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d
1146 (9th Cir. 2007) with Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv., Ass'n., 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
Likewise, courts disagree as to the type of knowledge required for contributory copyright infringement.
See infra Part ILA. The requirements for the active inducement variety of copyright infringement
remain unclear as well. See 5 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:41 (2008) (criticizing the
Grokster decision on this ground). For example, the Court has not specified whether a subjective belief
that the direct actor's conduct is not infringing insulates the defendant from inducement liability. See
Charles W. Adams, Indirect Infringement from a Tort Law Perspective, 42 U. RICH. L. REv. 635, 635
(2007). It is also unsettled whether a defendant could be liable for encouraging another person to copy a
copyrighted work based on the erroneous belief that the other person had a fair use right to the work.
See Tiffany A. Parcher, Comment, The Fact and Fiction of Grokster and Sony: Using Factual
Comparisons to Uncover the Legal Rule, 54 UCLA L. REV. 509, 522-23 (2006). Moreover, it remains
unclear whether the same materiality requirement for standard contributory liability applies, or whether
inducement plaintiffs may dispense with a materiality standard altogether. See Visa, 494 F.3d at 800-02
(indicating that the two types of contributory liability could be described as "material contribution
liability" and "inducement liability").
5. Visa, 494 F.3d at 788; Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
6. Some call for, in contrast to the current state of affairs, uniform treatment of the liability of
intermediaries for copyright and trademark infringement. See Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet
Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 115-16 (2007).
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construe secondary copyright infringement doctrine in such a relatively expansive
manner. In conclusion, Part IV offers some suggestions on where courts should
and should not turn for guidance in explaining the differences between copyright
and trademark in this area.
I. VICARIOUS INFRINGEMENT
For both copyright and trademark, vicarious liability requires a particular
relationship between the defendant and the direct infringer as well as the
defendant's receipt of a financial benefit from the infringement. 7 In assessing the
relationship prong for vicarious copyright infringement claims, courts require that
the defendant have the "right and ability to supervise" the infringing activity.
8
When it comes to vicarious trademark infringement cases, courts apply a higher
standard, demanding that the defendant and the infringer have authority to bind one
another in transactions with third parties. 9 Courts also differ in their construction
of the financial benefit requirement. Infringement that acts as a hypothetical draw
for consumers to the defendant's business satisfies the requirement for copyright
owners, but not for trademark owners.10 As I have discussed with John Tehranian
in another article, the result of these doctrinal differences is a legal regime that is
demonstrably friendlier to copyright owners than to trademark holders, as
trademark defendants without a relationship of actual or apparent authority over the
direct infringer or an entitlement to a percentage of the direct infringer's profits
from infringement are exempt from liability. 
1I
A. VICARIOUS RELATIONSHIPS
The divergence between vicarious liability for copyright and trademark
infringement has continued since the Grokster decision issued in 2005. Grokster
involved a claim for contributory, not vicarious, infringement, so one might expect
that the decision had no impact on vicarious infringement law. Nevertheless, in
dicta, the Grokster court provided its own definition of vicarious copyright
infringement. It explained that a defendant "infringes vicariously by profiting from
7. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971); AT&T v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1440-41 (3d Cir. 1994).
8. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WB Music Corp., 508 F.3d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 2007).
9. See Visa, 494 F.3d at 807; Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 752, 779-80
(N.D. Il. 2008).
10. See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: The Divergent
Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1364,
1374-77 (2006).
11. See id. at 1369-78. See also Symantec Corp. v. CD Micro, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (D. Or.
2003) (holding defendant responsible for secondary copyright infringement but not secondary trademark
infringement on the same facts); United States v. Washington Mint, LLC, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (D.
Minn. 2000) (same); Marvel Enters., Inc. v. NCSoft Corp., No. CV 04-9253, 2005 WL 878090 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 9, 2005) (denying motion to dismiss vicarious and contributory copyright infringement claims
but granting motion for vicarious and contributory trademark infringement claims).
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direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it." 12 Given
the sparse precedent available for assessing vicarious copyright liability,
particularly from the Supreme Court, it is not surprising that some courts have
picked up on this language and adopted it as an official definition of vicarious
copyright infringement. 13
It is too early to determine the true import of this language. On the one hand,
courts could potentially seize on Grokster's introduction of the word "limit" to
enlarge the scope of vicarious copyright liability. In evaluating whether a
relationship exists between the defendant and the direct actor that should be subject
to vicarious liability, courts assess the degree of control that the former has over the
latter. The emphasis on control flows from the traditional requirement of a "right
to supervise" the direct infringer for vicarious copyright infringement. For the
most part, courts have interpreted a "right to supervise" as a capacity to dictate the
daily activities of the direct infringer.1 4  "[M]ere potential to influence" a direct
infringer is insufficient to subject a defendant to liability. 15 Copyright plaintiffs
might argue, however, that the Supreme Court's use of the phrase "stop or limit"
signals an intent to expand vicarious copyright liability to include relationships
where the defendant has only a partial ability to restrict the direct actor's infringing
behavior. A court could conceivably interpret "limit" to recognize liability against
such defendants based on their capacity to influence the behavior of the direct actor
and at least potentially curb its infringing activity. For example, a credit card
company that processes payments from customers of an infringing website might
be able to "limit" infringement by denying its services to the website. The credit
card company would arguably be unable to "stop" the infringement because the
website could resort to alternate funding mechanisms if the company's services
were withdrawn. 16 Yet under the Grokster definition of vicarious liability, capacity
to prevent the infringement from occurring may not be strictly necessary. Thus far
in interpreting this language, however, courts do not seem to have lowered their
standards for vicarious copyright infringement.1
7
12. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). In a
footnote, the Court also indicated that the traditional definition of vicarious copyright infringement-
"when the defendant profits directly from the infringement and has a right and ability to supervise the
direct infringer"-continues to apply. Id. at 930 n.9.
13. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007); Pegasus
Imaging Corp. v. Northrup Grumman Corp., No. 8:07-CV-1937-T-27, 2008 WL 5099691, at *2 (M.D.
Fla. Nov. 25, 2008).
14. See Yen, supra note 1, at 200-01; Century Consultants, Ltd. v. Miller Group, Inc., No. 03-
3105, 2008 WL 345541, at *8 (C.D. Il1. Feb. 7, 2008) (noting weekly meetings between vicarious
defendant and direct infringer).
15. See Banff Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1108-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); see also
Howard Johnson Co. v. Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 1518 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
16. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv., Ass'n., 494 F.3d 788, 803 (9th Cir. 2007).
17. The Ninth Circuit concluded that a credit card company's ability to cut off funding to known
infringers did not give it "a right to stop or limit" infringement. Id. at 802. In addition, a district court
that quoted the aforementioned language from Grokster determined that a website that enabled the
sharing of uploaded infringing videos did not satisfy the standard for vicarious liability even though it
had the capacity to block or remove the infringing content. Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586
F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1150-51 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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On the other hand, a judge could interpret the Court's use of the word
"declining" to restrict vicarious copyright liability. 18 The Grokster opinion stated
that "declining to exercise a right to stop or limit" infringing conduct, when
combined with receipt of a financial benefit, subjects a defendant to vicarious
copyright liability. 19 This language indicates that vicarious liability will only attach
when the defendant fails to make some attempt to stop or limit infringement. A
defendant that undertook some action to prevent infringement, but not enough to be
successful, could argue that it had a defense to liability. Once some good faith
effort at prevention has been attempted, that is enough to avoid a finding of
vicarious copyright infringement. Such an interpretation would be a departure
from prior case law holding that some effort to prevent infringement does not
immunize a vicarious copyright defendant.
20
Thus far, the courts do not seem to have used Grokster to introduce a good faith
effort defense to vicarious copyright infringement. 21 For example, when a licensee
of Mattel's Barbie trademark distributed a product that infringed on several musical
compositions held by the plaintiff, Mattel was charged with vicarious copyright
infringement. On multiple occasions, Mattel queried the licensee and requested
and received documentation representing that the licensee was authorized to use the
18. See Yen, supra note 1, at 227-29.
19. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005).
20. See Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1328-29 (D. Mass.
1994). See also W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 500 (5th ed. 1984);
STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 4:1, at 531-32 (1983). Good faith efforts
may, however, absolve defendants from liability for contributory infringement. See Jane C. Ginsburg,
Separating the Sony Sheep From the Grokster Goats: Reckoning the Future Business Plans of
Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 577, 579-80, 587 (2008) (discussing
"the possible emergence of an obligation of good faith efforts to avoid infringement" and the
development of a "safe harbor" for use of filtering technologies). It should also be noted that under the
safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), an internet service provider
may be immunized from monetary damages for contributory infringement if it has a history of taking
prompt action to respond to infringement notices and terminating the accounts of repeat offenders. See
17 U.S.C. § 512(i); Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d. at 1142-45. Interestingly, online businesses have been
adopting policies for notice and takedown of infringing trademark materials even though there is no safe
harbor provision of the DMCA for trademark infringement. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 108; Ira S.
Nathenson, Looking for Fair Use in the DMCA 's Safety Dance, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. (forthcoming
2009).
21. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing
the definition of vicarious copyright infringement from Grokster, yet contending that it merely
represented an analysis of the defendant's "right and ability to supervise the direct infringer," and
rephrasing the Grokster definition of vicarious liability as when "a defendant... has both a legal right to
stop or limit the directly infringing conduct, as well as the practical ability to do so," ignoring the
Court's choice of the word "declining"); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WB Music Corp., 508 F.3d 394, 400
(6th Cir. 2007) (applying "right and ability to supervise" standard and failing to apply language from
Grokster); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Mirage Images, Inc., No. 1:04-CV-387, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42880,
at *31 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 2, 2005) (finding defendant liable for vicarious copyright infringement and
asserting that "the test [for vicarious copyright infringement] is not 'control,' it is 'the right and ability to
supervise'); but cf Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1153-54 (citing language from Grokster and finding that
the defendant qualified for safe harbor under section 512(c) of the DMCA, in part, because of the steps it
took to police infringement on its system).
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copyrighted materials. 22 One might infer from these facts that Mattel had exercised
some control over its licensee by demanding this information and thus, could not be
deemed to have "declined" to exercise the control necessary for vicarious copyright
infringement. Nevertheless, the court held that Mattel, by virtue of its contractual
right and ability to supervise its licensee, satisfied the requirements for vicarious
liability.23 Likewise, a flea market that worked closely with the local police to
bring an end to some of the infringing activity on its premises and remove
discovered counterfeit materials was still held vicariously liable for the copyright
infringement that continued to occur despite its prevention efforts. 24 In sum, the
Grokster opinion's alternative definition of vicarious infringement has had little
impact to date, but few appellate courts have had an opportunity to interpret
Grokster on this issue.
Regardless of the implications of Grokster for the scope of vicarious liability in
the future, vicarious liability remains an important cause of action in the arsenal of
copyright owners. Admittedly, in two recent Ninth Circuit cases, the same plaintiff
was unsuccessful at demonstrating a relationship between the defendant and the
direct infringer sufficient for vicarious copyright liability. 25  This may simply
reflect, however, the limited number of secondary infringement cases that have
worked their way up the appellate ladder since 2005. At the trial court level,
several copyright owners have successfully made cases for vicarious infringement
in the last three years. 26 In evaluating the relationship requirement for vicarious
copyright infringement, courts continue to impose liability in the absence of an
agency relationship. Instead, "the right and ability to supervise" seems to be
satisfied when a defendant is capable of directly acting to stop infringement from
occurring. For example, a flea market's ability to inspect the merchandise of its
vendors subjected the flea market to vicarious liability for the vendors' direct
copyright infringement. 27 Similarly, a court recently held that the Associated Press
could be liable for the infringing acts of subscribing media organizations, given its
power to review their use of its content.
28
22. Encore Entm't, LLC v. KlDdesigns, Inc., No. 3:03 1129, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44386,
at*51-*55 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2005).
23. Id. at *57-*60.
24. Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., No. 03-2670, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14988, at *29-
*37, *54 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006).
25. Amazon.corn, 508 F.3d 1146; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv., Ass'n., 494 F.3d 788, 803
(9th Cir. 2007).
26. The relationships between a school district and a computer consultant, a toy company and its
licensee, a flea market and its vendors, a nightclub and its disc jockeys, a software retailer and its clients,
a video game developer and its online users, a supermarket chain and its advertising agency and a
hotel's corporate officer and the hotel's performing musicians have all been deemed sufficient for
vicarious liability. See Century Consultants, Ltd. v. Miller Group, Inc., No. 03-3105, 2008 WL 345541
(C.D. I11. Feb. 7, 2008); KIDdesigns, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44386; Arista Records, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14988; Mirage Images, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42880; E Beats Music v. Andrews, 433 F. Supp.
2d 1322 (M.D. Ga. 2006); Rosenthal v. MPC Computers, LLC, 493 F. Supp. 2d 182 (D. Mass. 2007);
MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53988 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008); EMI Mills
Music, Inc. v. Empress Hotel, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.P.R. 2006).
27. Arista Records, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14988 at *31-*32.
28. McClatchey v. Associated Press, No. 3:05-cv-145, 2007 WL 776103, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 9,
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In contrast, since the Grokster decision, the vicarious trademark infringement
cause of action has become a dead letter. It is simply too hard to satisfy the
relationship requirement in light of recent precedent. A mere right or ability to
supervise the direct infringer remains insufficient for vicarious trademark
liability.29 Courts continue to reject the more generous standard afforded copyright
plaintiffs, instead forcing trademark litigants to prove a "formal" relationship or
"partnership" between the defendant and direct infringer. 30  Recent cases have
absolved a husband who went with his wife, the direct infringer, on missions to
find protected trade dress to copy and the corporate officer of a school that adopted
someone else's trademark as its own. 31 In both cases, the vicarious liability claim
was denied because the court concluded that the defendant did not have the
requisite level of legal authority over the infringer's behavior. The wife was not
bound to follow the husband's instruction and the school did not have to respond
only to the dictates of the corporate officer. 32 Even the allegation that the corporate
officer planned to have the school use the mark without permission was insufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss because he was not the sole decision-maker when it
came to naming the school.33 Thus, for trademark plaintiffs, demonstrating that the
defendant had some supervisory role over the direct infringer is normally
insufficient. Instead, they must prove that the defendant had complete individual
authority to bind the direct infringer. 34 On the other hand, individual corporate
officers, and others without unilateral authority to bind the direct infringer, have




29. See Vulcan Golf, LLC. v. Google Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 752, 780 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Hard Rock
Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Serv, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1992).
30. See Vulcan Golf 552 F. Supp. 2d at 780.
31. Diane von Furstenberg Studio v. Snyder, No. 1:06cv1356 (JCC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
66633 (E.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2007); Collins v. Marva Collins Preparatory Sch., No. 1:05cv614, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 49410 (S.D. Ohio July 9, 2007).
32. Diane von Furstenburg Studio, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66633, at *13-*14; Collins, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 49410, at *13-*14.
33. Collins, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49410, at *14.
34. Proof of this sort of unilateral ability to guide the infringer's behavior seems increasingly
unlikely in the online environment. Transactions between indirect and direct infringers are often
conducted over some distance and through multiple intermediaries. Additionally, businesses involved in
the distribution or supply of trademarked items are usually involved in many transactions at once. For
example, the online auction house eBay, accused of vicarious trademark infringement by Tiffany & Co.,
typically has some 100 million listings on its site at any given time. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576
F. Supp. 2d 463, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Thirteen hours of content are uploaded onto Google's YouTube
every minute. See Jeffrey Rosen, Google's Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 30, 2008, at 50.
While eBay and Google certainly have the legal right to scrutinize the postings on their sites, trademark
courts have been demanding something more for vicarious liability.
35. See, e.g., RCA/Ariola Int'l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 782 (8th Cir.
1988); Symantec Corp. v. CD Micro, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1275 (D. Or. 2003); United States v.
Wash. Mint, LLC, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1106-07 (D. Minn. 2000). Vicarious copyright liability is not
typically available, however, merely on the basis of employment as a corporate officer or membership
on a company's board of directors. Instead, some greater proof of an ability to shape the affairs of the
infringing corporation is required. See 6 PATRY, supra note 4, at § 21:81.
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B. DIRECT FINANCIAL BENEFIT
Meanwhile, courts construing vicarious copyright infringement claims continue
to hold that the second prong-receipt of a direct financial benefit from the
infringement--can be satisfied merely where the direct infringer's conduct may
hypothetically draw more customers to the secondary defendant. 36 Thus, a swap
meet can be vicariously liable for the conduct of an infringing vendor even though
the flea market charges all of its vendors the same flat fee regardless of their total
number of sales.3 7  When courts in the 1990s held that infringing activity that
hypothetically might draw more customers to the vicarious defendant's place of
business met the direct financial benefit requirement, their reasoning was
controversial. 38  Now, however, this reasoning has hardened into irrefutable
doctrine. As one court recently explained, "elementary economics" mandates that
"anything that serves as a 'draw' for customers will necessarily serve to increase
[the vicarious defendants'] revenues" and, therefore, satisfy the direct benefit
requirement. 39 This draw may result in vicarious copyright liability even if it is
insignificant to the vicarious defendant's bottom line.40 Thus, in a case where it
was determined that the defendant flea market's rental fees were unrelated to its
vendors' sales, only nine percent of the flea market's total customers came to the
market to purchase CDs, and an unknown number within that percentage sought
out infringing copies of copyrighted music, the court held that such a small,
indeterminate number still satisfied the direct financial benefit requirement. 41
In contrast, for claims of vicarious trademark liability, courts have insisted that
the defendant's financial benefit be immediately tied to the infringement. Recent
vicarious trademark infringement cases have not even addressed the financial
benefit requirement, dispensing with the plaintiffs claim strictly on the basis of the
"relationship" criterion. 42 This leaves in place a body of precedent which holds
that, without more, trademark infringement that merely draws more customers to
the vicarious defendant's place of business does not constitute a direct financial
benefit. An important court of appeals case from 1992 indicated that the financial
36. See, e.g., Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 857 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (opining that
the current case law defining "direct financial benefit" includes "even a future hope to monetize"), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part and remanded by Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir.
2007).
37. Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., No. 03-2670, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14988,at *38
(D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006).
38. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Markiewicz, Comment, Seeking Shelter from the MP3 Storm: How Far
Does the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Online Service Provider Liability Limitation Reach?, 7
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 423, 432 (1999); Kenneth A. Walton, Is a Website Like a Flea Market Stall?
How Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction Increases the Risk of Third-Party Copyright Infringement Liability for
Online Service Providers, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 921,943-44 (1997).
39. Arista Records, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14988, at *42.
40. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004) ("There is no requirement that
the draw be substantial.") (internal quotation marks omitted); 10 Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.,
No. C06-03926, 2007 WL 1113800, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2007) (affirming that the hypothetical
draw to the vicarious infringer need not be substantial).
41. Arista Records, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14988, at *41-44.
42. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv., Assn., 494 F.3d 788, 807-08 (9th Cir. 2007).
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benefit requirement was not satisfied in the case of a flea market owner who
received rental fees from a vendor that engaged in blatant trademark
infringement. 43  Instead, the court suggested that only an actual profit-sharing
regime between the infringer and the market owner, not a flat fee for all vendors,
could satisfy the requirement even though the increased foot traffic in the flea
market from the vendor's illegal behavior arguably redounded to the market
owner's benefit.
44
Given the courts' rigorous interpretation of the relationship and financial benefit
requirements in vicarious trademark infringement cases, plaintiffs alleging
vicarious trademark infringement today find themselves in a nearly impossible
position. In a recent case in the Central District of California, not only did the
court hold in favor of the defendant on summary judgment, but it awarded
attorney's fees to one of the defendants, finding the plaintiff's vicarious liability
argument without merit, in part, because "no court has ever imposed vicarious
trademark liability" on the basis of an apparent partnership. 45 Practitioners have
picked up on this, suggesting that filing a claim for vicarious trademark
infringement will soon become an empty gesture.46  The most anticipated
secondary trademark liability case of 2008 pitted jewelry-maker Tiffany & Co.
against online auction house eBay.47 Tiffany accused eBay of contributing to the
infringement of counterfeiters by providing the forum for sales of inauthentic
merchandise misleadingly labeled with the Tiffany mark. It is interesting to note
that Tiffany, judging from its complaint in the case and the trial court's final
opinion, did not bother to specifically prosecute a vicarious liability claim against
eBay. If the more generous standards applicable to vicarious copyright
infringement were applied, Tiffany may have had a good argument for such
liability. eBay arguably possesses the ability to supervise the conduct of the sellers
on its system and the presence of affordable knockoffjewelry may very well have
provided a financial benefit by attracting more consumers and allowing eBay to
charge more for its services and website advertising space.4t But the case law on
vicarious trademark infringement made it unlikely that such arguments could have
43. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 & n.4 (7th
Cir. 1992).
44. Id.
45. D.S.P.T. Int'l v. Nahum, No. CV06-0308, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25405, at *7-*8 n.2 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 17, 2008). See also 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. Goto.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 281 n.5
(D.N.J. 2006) (stating that "the Third Circuit has declined to apply vicarious liability in the trademark
context").
46. See Lynn H. Murray & Laura K. McNally, Liability for "Hosting" Counterfeit Sales: Tiffany
v. eBay, 76 BNA's PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 829, 830 (2008) (stating that in view of the high
standard for an actionable relationship, "claimants have had little to no success pursuing vicarious
trademark infringement actions"); see also id. at 830 n. 11 ("Courts have recognized successful pleading
of vicarious trademark infringement actions, but we found no published cases in which a plaintiff
prevailed on a vicarious trademark infringement theory.").
47. Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
48. See id. at 475, 478-79 ("Because eBay's revenue and profit growth is dependent, in
significant part, on the completion of sales between eBay sellers and eBay buyers, eBay works closely
with sellers to foster the increase of their sales on eBay, including the sales of Tiffany jewelry.").
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passed muster. Instead, Tiffany focused its attention on the more viable cause of
action for secondary trademark infringement: contributory liability.
II. CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
As with vicarious infringement, contributory infringement doctrine differs
depending on the type of intellectual property at issue. For either trademark or
copyright, the plaintiff must prove knowledge of infringement as well as the
defendant's material contribution to that infringement. Generally speaking, courts
have interpreted the knowledge requirement more generously for copyright, finding
the requirement satisfied by mere awareness of the potential for infringement and
failure to take prophylactic measures. In contrast, contributory trademark
infringement has required that specific instances of infringement be brought to the
defendant's attention. At the same time, merely producing the opportunity or
means for infringement to occur can satisfy the material contribution requirement
for contributory copyright infringement while contributory trademark defendants
must be shown to supply or directly control and monitor the tools of infringement.




Since 2005, this divergence has remained evident in the case law and perhaps
even widened. Courts continue to interpret the contributory infringement
knowledge requirement very differently, depending on whether trademark or
copyright infringement is at issue. For trademark, there is a firm distinction
between a defendant's actionable knowledge of infringement and situations where
some infringement could be expected. In the Supreme Court's only explicit
pronouncement on the issue of contributory trademark infringement, the Court
provided clear guidance that expectations of unspecified infringement by unknown
downstream users would not suffice. 50 Following this precedent, the Tiffany v.
eBay court rejected a knowledge standard based on reasonable anticipation of
infringement." In keeping with case law dating back sixty years that holds that a
contributory trademark defendant is not "his brother's or customer's keeper," 52 the
eBay court required instead that the plaintiff trademark holder demonstrate the
defendant's actual or constructive knowledge of specific instances of
infringement.53  Although Tiffany provided notification that many listings on
eBay's website were counterfeit, the knowledge criterion was not satisfied.
Instead, eBay had to know of specific instances of infringement by specific
49. See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 10, at 1378-94.
50. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.13 (1982).
51. eBay, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 502-03.
52. Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980, 989 (D. Mass. 1946), aff'd,
162 F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1947).
53. eBay, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 510.
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infringing sellers. 54
In contrast, a fault line exists in contributory copyright law, with some courts
requiring knowledge of specific instances of infringement and others allowing
generalized expectations of infringement to satisfy the knowledge standard. For
example, after laboriously examining several inconsistent precedents on the issue, a
district court concluded that "reasonable knowledge" is all that is required for
contributory copyright infringement.55  In the court's view, this meant that
investors in the Napster file sharing service could be contributorily liable even
without actual or constructive awareness of specific acts of infringement.
56
Interestingly, the court read the Grokster decision as endorsing a broad
interpretation of the knowledge standard, viewing the decision as a rebuke to Ninth
Circuit precedent requiring specific knowledge of infringement. 57  Similarly,
another court recently rejected a defendant's contention that it could not be liable
without knowledge of "specific infringements." 58  Other courts have been more
demanding, exonerating defendants that had not been aware of specific infringing
actions. 59 Thus, depending on the court hearing the case, some copyright plaintiffs
can take advantage of a knowledge standard akin to reasonable anticipation of
infringement, which is not open to trademark plaintiffs.60
Another difference emerges when comparing the knowledge standard for
contributory copyright and trademark infringement. Courts have recently
suggested that the knowledge standard for contributory copyright infringement is
satisfied by mere notice of a claim of unlawful distribution of a copyrighted work. 61
Of course, notice of illegal conduct is a far cry from real knowledge of illegal
conduct. Not every source providing notice is credible, particularly in the case of
copyright owners who may have improper incentives for requesting that materials
be taken off the internet, even when those materials represent a fair use of the
54. Id. at 507-10 & n.34.
55. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., No. C MDL-00-1369, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30338, at
*33 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2006).
56. Id..
57. Id. at *27-*28.
58. Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., No. 03-2670, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14988, at *47-
*49 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006).
59. See 6 PATRY, supra note 4, at § 21:47 (describing split over interpretation of knowledge
requirement).
60. Although "reasonable anticipation" of trademark infringement is not enough for contributory
trademark infringement, the knowledge requirement may be satisfied by a finding of "willful blindness."
Willful blindness is a subjective standard while reasonable anticipation is an objective standard that
asks, as with a negligence claim, what the reasonable person would have known under the
circumstances. See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc.955 F.2d 1143, 1151
(7th Cir. 1992); Nike, Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1369-70 (S.D. Ga. 2003).
To be willfully blind, the contributory defendant must know that illegal conduct was highly probable.
See Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). The defendant must
also purposefully contrive to avoid learning of the illegal conduct, for example, by failing to inquire
further out of fear of what she might learn. Id. A finding of willful blindness can also satisfy the
knowledge requirement for contributory copyright infringement. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig.,
334 F.3d 643, 650-51 (7th Cir. 2003).
61. See Laura A. Heymann, Knowing How to Know: Secondary Liability for Speech 8 (Nov. 14,
2008, unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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copyrighted work.62 Nevertheless, courts have held that "[t]he knowledge element
for contributory copyright infringement is met in those cases where a party has
been notified of specific infringing uses of its technology and fails to act to prevent
such infringing uses, or willfully blinds itself to such infringing uses. "
63
While the current regime for copyright law allows copyright owners to merely
notify the secondary defendant of potential infringement and then put the burden on
the defendant to investigate and take down the infringing content, contributory
trademark doctrine refuses to find the knowledge requirement satisfied on the basis
of notice alone. A trademark owner's mere assertion that infringement has taken
place, as in the case of a demand letter sent to a domain name registrar, has been
held insufficient. 64 The eBay court, in refusing to approve a mere notice standard
for contributory knowledge, cautioned that the notice of infringing conduct
provided by Tiffany to eBay "was not a notice of actual infringement, but instead,
was a notice of Tiffany's good-faith belief that a particular item or listing was
infringing." 65 It went on to justify its adoption of a more rigorous knowledge
standard by explaining that trademark's contributory infringement doctrine keeps
the primary burden of policing the use of trademarks on the mark holder. 66 A
notice standard would improperly shift that burden to intermediaries like online
auction houses and search engines.
B. MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION
The case law remains ambiguous on the second contributory infringement
prong: material contribution. Not everyone with knowledge of a misdeed can be
contributorily liable. The law is reluctant to force ambivalent onlookers to act as
Good Samaritans. Rather, only those who know of misconduct and also further
that misconduct in a measurably significant way will be held accountable. 67 Of
course, the quantum of active support for an illegal endeavor needed for culpability
is extremely difficult to specify. To the extent that courts have tried to delineate the
amount of assistance required for contributory infringement, they have moved in
different directions depending on the intellectual property regime at issue.
62. See Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1003 (2008) (discussing how the DMCA notice-and-
takedown process can be used to suppress critical speech).
63. Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877, 886 (N.D. Ill. 2005);
Newborn v. Yahoo!, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 181, 186 (D.D.C. 2005); see also Century Consultants v.
Miller Group, No. 03-3105, 2008 WL 345541, at *7 (C.D. I11. Feb. 7, 2008).
64. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, 985 F. Supp. 949, 963-64 (C.D. Cal. 1997),
aff'd, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Sly Magazine, LLC v. Weider Publ'ns, LLC, 241 F.R.D.
527, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Fare Deals, Ltd. v. World Choice Travel.com, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 678,
690-91 (D. Md. 2001); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
65. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 515 n.38 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
66. Id. at 518.
67, Criminal law's doctrine of contributory liability takes a different approach, largely ignoring
the contribution requirement but alternatively requiring intent, not just knowledge, for liability. See
Mark Bartholomew, Cops, Robbers and Search Engines: The Questionable Role of Criminal Law in
Contributory Infringement Doctrine, BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
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Courts evaluating contributory trademark responsibility scrutinize the
defendant's relationship with the means of infringement. Liability will attach if a
defendant directly controls or monitors the instrumentality used to infringe. 68
Without a direct relationship with the infringing activity, there is no material
contribution, and therefore no contributory infringement. For example, in a recent
case, the Third Circuit explained that it required "central participation" in the direct
infringer's affairs for contributory trademark infringement. 69 In the eBay case, the
court explained that it was not enough to supply the environment for infringement
to take place, but that the defendant must have direct control over that environment
as well. 70  Thus, without a particular sort of close relationship between the
defendant and the direct infringer, no contributory infringement will be found. As
a consequence, plaintiffs have difficulty prosecuting claims for contributory
trademark infringement against defendants that facilitate a party that facilitates the
direct infringer. Those sorts of relationships are simply too indirect to satisfy the
material contribution requirement. 7
1
Although not applied in a consistent manner, the material contribution
requirement is evaluated on different terms for copyright. The degree of separation
between the defendant and the direct infringer is often not a consideration in the
analysis of material contribution. 72 Instead, material contribution is evaluated by
assessing the defendant's power to facilitate infringement.73 This is particularly
true for defendants operating online. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a special
refinement of the copyright material contribution analysis in "the context of
cyberspace." 74  In the Ninth Circuit's view, because online services "can
significantly magnify the effects of otherwise immaterial infringing activities," the
test for material contribution must be expanded in that context to encompass
defendants that fail to take "simple measures" to prevent infringement.75 Note that
68. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv., Ass'n., 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 2007); Habeeba's
Dance of the Arts, Ltd. v. Knoblauch, 430 F. Supp. 2d 709, 714 (S.D. Ohio 2006); but see Medline
Indus., Inc. v. Strategic Commercial Solutions, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 2d 979, 992 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 2008)
(contending that the "direct control or monitoring" standard has not been adopted in the Seventh
Circuit).
69. Basketball Mktg. Co., Inc. v. FX Digital Media, Inc., 257 Fed. Appx. 492, 495 n.5 (3d Cir.
2007).
70. eBay, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 506-07.
71. See, e.g., Baden Sports, Inc. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Molten, No. C06-210MJP, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 51252, at *23-*24 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2007) (no contributory trademark liability against
defendant foreign supplier that sold products to additional foreign supplier who in turn sold the products
in the United States, even though the defendant knew that its product would reach U.S. customers).
72. See Benjamin H. Glatstein, Comment, Tertiary Copyright Liability, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1605,
1612-13 (2004) (stating that several courts, including "the seminal contributory copyright liability case,
Gershwin Publishing Corp v Columbia Artists Management, Inc.," suggest that "the degree of separation
between primary infringers and liable parties is not a material factor in the analysis").
73. Although proximity and power are related concerns, they are not the same. A utility company
may have great power over a user in that if it shuts off the electricity, the user's infringing conduct ends.
Nevertheless, the relationship between the utility and the user is not one that we would describe as
"proximate" or "direct."
74. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1171 (9th Cir. 2007).
75. Id. at 1172.
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this test does not analyze the "directness" of the defendant's relationship with the
direct infringement, at least not explicitly. Instead, it asks whether the defendant is
capable of stopping infringement, regardless of its degree of involvement with the
direct infringer. Thus, even though Google did not have a particularly direct or
strong relationship with a group of websites infringing the plaintiff's copyright, the
Ninth Circuit held that Google likely materially contributed to infringement
because its search engine helped consumers find those infringing websites. 76 It was
not Google's closeness with the direct infringers that worked to its disadvantage
but rather its sheer importance and ubiquitous presence as an online search tool. 77
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit cited the Supreme Court's reasoning in Grokster as
support for its broadening of the material contribution test for online defendants,
even though Grokster did not address the material contribution requirement. 78
This is not to say that all courts take such a broad view of the relationships
sufficient to generate a material contribution for contributory copyright
infringement. In other situations, the courts have denied contributory copyright
liability because the contact between the defendant and the direct infringer was too
indirect, even if the defendant could have taken simple action to stop the
infringement from happening. 79 In the recent Perfect 10 v. Visa case, the Ninth
Circuit held that credit card companies were not contributorily liable for processing
the consumer payments that made the directly infringing websites financially
viable.80 The court explained that there was no material contribution because the
credit card companies had no "direct connection" to the infringement.8'
Nevertheless, the variance within copyright law on this issue shows that that
76. Id. at 1172-73.
77. Id. at 1172.
78. To justify its creation of a new type of liability for contributory copyright infringement, the
Court in Grokster noted that because of the impossibility of prosecuting infringement claims against all
of those who improperly used the defendant's file sharing service, "the only practical alternative" was to
recognize a claim against the distributor of the file sharing service. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929-30 (2005). The Amazon.com court cited this language in justifying
its own holding. See Amazon.corn, 508 F.3d at 1172. Both decisions expand the scope of contributory
copyright liability, but in different ways. Grokster does this by holding that evidence of an intent to
induce infringement trumps the safe harbor for technologies capable of substantial noninfringing uses.
Id. at 933-36. Amazon.com does this by creating a more plaintiff-friendly standard for determining the
material contribution of defendants engaging in online activities. In both cases, the courts seem to
assess the consequences of online infringement and then engage in creative lawmaking based on that
assessment. Such an approach to judicial decisionmaking may be quite reasonable. See LAWRENCE
BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 57 (1997) ("For several decades, political scientists have
agreed on the proposition that judges do more than apply the law, that their conceptions of good policy
influence their choices."). But it should be done cautiously with the realization that the public policy
argument that militates in favor of one particular legal construction should not necessarily carry the day
when other related rules of law are being evaluated.
79. See, e.g., Jalbert v. Gratuski, 554 F. Supp. 2d 57, 73 (D. Mass. 2008) ("Mere passive inaction,
without more, is not enough to support a claim of contributory [copyright] infringement.").
80. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv., Ass'n., 494 F.3d 788, 796 (9th Cir. 2007).
81. Id. The court hedged its bets by finding that the material contribution standard was also not
satisfied because the availability of other payment mechanisms meant that the credit card companies did
not have a real ability to prevent infringement if they withdrew their services from the offending
websites. Id. at 797-98.
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material contribution can be evaluated more flexibly for contributory copyright
cases than in the corresponding body of law in trademark.
11. EXPLAINING THE SECONDARY INFRINGEMENT DIVERGENCE
As described in Parts I and II and illustrated in Tables 1 and 2 below, secondary
infringement law after Grokster remains more generous to indirect trademark
defendants than indirect copyright defendants. For vicarious copyright
infringement, courts continue to interpret the requirement of a particular
relationship with the direct infringer broadly, refusing to exclude non-agency
relationships. For trademark, however, the courts are more circumspect, only
imposing vicarious liability on those with a recognized legal authority over the
actions of the direct infringer. Indirect and hypothetical returns are enough for
vicarious copyright liability, but vicarious trademark liability demands that the
indirect defendant receive an immediate financial benefit from the infringing
activity.
Table 1 - Vicarious Infringement after Grokster
Copyright Law
" Vicarious defendant must
have a "right and ability to
supervise" the infringing
conduct
* Requirement satisfied in
several cases since 2005
" Unclear whether dicta in
Grokster defining an
actionable relationship as
having "a right to stop or
limit" infringing conduct will
have an effect on vicarious
copyright infringement
Trademark Law
" Vicarious defendant must
have "an apparent or actual
partnership" with the direct
infringer, "authority to bind"
the direct infringer in
transactions with third
parties, or "exercise joint
ownership or control [with
the direct infringer] over the
infringing product"





Financial Benefit * May be satisfied by 0 Post-Grukster cases do not
Requirement infringement that draws address this requirement
customers to defendant's 0 Pre-Grokster precedent
business even when defendant requires actual profit-
charges direct infringer a flat sharing regime with direct
fee infringer, not a draw
" Draw may be hypothetical
" Amount of money received
by defendant may be
insignificant
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For contributory infringement, trademark plaintiffs must demonstrate knowledge
of specific instances of infringement. In contrast, copyright plaintiffs benefit from
a knowledge requirement that can countenance a mere generalized knowledge of
infringement. In addition, some courts allow notice of infringement from the
plaintiff, as opposed to a verified understanding of the infringement by the
defendant, to satisfy the knowledge standard for contributory copyright
infringement. Notice does not satisfy the knowledge requirement for contributory
trademark infringement. In evaluating material contribution for contributory
trademark liability, courts require that the defendant supply the instrumentality
used to infringe or that the defendant directly control and monitor that
instrumentality. Some courts allow more indirect contributions to infringement to
satisfy the material contribution standard for copyright.
Table 2 - Contributory Infringement after Grokster
Copyright Law Trademark Law
Knowledge 0 Some courts permit * Generalized knowledge or
Requirement generalized expectations of "reasonable anticipation"
infringement to satisfy the of infringement does not
requirement satisfy the requirement
. Some courts permit mere . Mere notice does not
notice of infringement to satisfy the requirement
satisfy the requirement
Material 0 Some courts, particularly in 0 "Central participation"
Contribution the online context, look to the required in the
Requirement power wielded by the infringement; defendant
defendant rather than the must supply the
directness of its relationship instrumentality used to
with the primary infringer infringe or directly control
and monitor it
Judges are aware of the doctrinal double standard described above. Sometimes
they take care to note that the rules for secondary liability must be evaluated
differently depending on the type of intellectual property at issue.82 But they do
not articulate an underlying rationale for these doctrinal differences. In this Part, I
speculate on why the divergence has occurred, for both vicarious and contributory
infringement, and whether it makes sense. The Article concludes with some
suggestions for where courts can turn for guidance in developing a more coherent
82. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. MPC Computers, LLC, 493 F. Supp. 2d 182, 191 n.4 (D. Mass. 2007);
Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877, 892 n.18 (N.D. I11. 2005).
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body of secondary infringement law.
A. VICARIOUS INFRINGEMENT
Does it make sense to preserve the vicarious liability cause of action for
copyright owners but not for trademark holders? Vicarious liability means
responsibility for another's wrongs "irrespective of one's own participation in
them."83 The rationale behind vicarious liability differs from most other types of
liability (e.g., negligence) because the doctrine does not require any fault on the
part of the defendant. In fact, vicarious liability is specifically designed to avoid
consideration of fault.8 4 Although there have been many suggested reasons for
why one party should be responsible for the tortious conduct of another party in the
absence of fault, the most frequent suggestion is that vicarious liability is justified
by the need to distribute losses to solvent parties when direct tortfeasors lack the
means to compensate victims for their injuries. 85
As stated in Part I, the Grokster decision did not directly address vicarious
liability, instead determining liability on the basis of a newfound strain of
contributory infringement law. Nevertheless, judges often fail to distinguish
between vicarious and contributory infringement and the Supreme Court has
repeatedly lumped the two doctrines together. 86 Thus, even though the Grokster
decision does not directly address a claim for vicarious infringement, its reasoning
may offer some clues as to the Court's general outlook on the philosophy behind
vicarious copyright responsibility. The decision suggests some sympathy with
generally expanding secondary infringement law in situations where direct
infringers are not providing adequate restitution. The direct infringement at issue
in Grokster was the reproduction and distribution of copyrighted content by users
of the Grokster peer-to-peer file sharing network. The Court explained that "the
argument for imposing indirect liability [was] a powerful one" because of the
impossibility of enforcing rights in the copyrighted works against the millions of
direct infringers who used Grokster. 87 As a result, "the only practical alternative"
was to seek liability against the file sharing service "on a theory of contributory or
vicarious infringement."88 In other words, the Court chose to work backwards, first
83. John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 127, 130 n.2 (2007).
84. See P.S. ATiYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 13 (1967); Fleming James, Jr.,
Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REV. 161, 161 (1954) (explaining that the reasons behind vicarious
liability "are no part of a philosophy which rests liability on personal moral shortcoming"); id. at 172
(stating that vicarious liability "has subordinated fault to the need for compensation").
85. See ATtYAH, supra note 84, at 22; ARTHUR BEST & DAVID W. BARNES, BASIC TORT LAW:
CASES, STATUTES AND PROBLEMS 390 (2003); see also Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. NevadaITIG, Inc.,
855 F. Supp. 1314, 1326 (D. Mass. 1994) (explaining that the test for vicarious copyright infringement
is a proxy for, among other things, "the defendant's ability to spread losses").
86. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984);
Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 846, 854-55 (1982); see also Diane von Furstenberg
Studio v. Snyder, No. 1:06cv1356 (JCC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66633, at *13 (E.D. Va. Oct. 23,
2007).
87. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929-30 (2005).
88. Id. at 930.
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establishing that there was a social problem worthy of its involvement and then
recharacterizing the law of secondary liability to hold the defendant liable to solve
that problem.
If this is a valid method of legal reasoning-i.e., determining liability based on
the prudential concerns of copyright holders who cannot achieve adequate relief
from direct infringers-then the next question is why these prudential concerns do
not provoke the same judicial result when the plaintiff is a trademark owner. One
reason might be that the scope of the problem does not seem as large when online
manipulation of trademarks is compared to the scourge of peer-to-peer file sharing.
Vicarious liability is only justified when the nature of the harm caused by the direct
actor is such that the direct actor cannot satisfy the relief needs of the wronged
plaintiff. Recognition of the doctrine in particular areas of the law can be traced to
specific technological and societal changes that have made the acts of direct
tortfeasors so harmful and widespread that courts or legislatures felt compelled to
take action.89  For example, after noting the dangers to the general public of
automotive travel, courts and legislatures imposed vicarious liability on automobile
owners for the negligent actions of drivers. 90 Similarly, struck by the increasing
social problem of local terrorism of racial minorities, some states passed laws
making municipalities vicariously liable for injuries sustained from mob violence
within their corporate limits.91 So the real question is whether there is a perceived
threat sufficient to warrant expanding the scope of the law to include a new group
of vicarious defendants. If the perception is that trademark holders are managing
just fine with conventional suits against direct infringers, then there is no need to
impose vicarious liability on the intermediaries associated with those direct
infringers.
To some degree, this may explain the discrepancies in the two vicarious liability
doctrines. Others have noted today's "heightened public consciousness over
copyright issues." 92 Music and motion picture companies have mounted a major
campaign to indoctrinate citizens as to the dangers of copyright infringement,
placing anti-piracy public service announcements at the beginning of motion
picture screenings and DVDs and attempting to force colleges to instruct their
charges on the dos and don'ts of online file swapping. The entertainment industry
continues to paint a picture of rampant piracy and endangerment of America's edge
89. See Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 111 (1916); KEETON,
supra note 20, at 500.
90. See S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629, 631-35 (Fla. 1920); KEETON, supra note 20, at
522-23; Legislation, Vicarious Liability: Statutes as a Guide to Its Basis, 45 HARv. L. REV. 171, 173-
74(1931).
91. See KEETON, supra note 20, at 528-29; R.F. Chase, Annotation, Municipal Liability for
Personal Injury or Death Under Mob Violence or Antilynching Statutes, 26 A.L.R.3d 1142 (1969);
Vicarious Liability: Statutes as a Guide to Its Basis, supra note 90, at 172.
92. See John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007
UTAH L. REV. 537, 539 (2007); see also Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in
Copyright Law, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 649, 650 (2007) (remarking that "copyright law itself also has risen
to prominence in law schools, law firms, corporations, educational institutions, governments, and the
public consciousness").
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in cultural exporting. 93  Concern over digital piracy of copyrighted works has
captured the sympathies of our elected leaders. Just recently, apparently goaded by
these concerns even in the midst of financial crisis, Congress passed new
intellectual property legislation that increased the power of copyright holders by
creating civil enforcement mechanisms for successful copyright plaintiffs.
94
There does not seem to be the same sense that businesses with strong trademarks
are in danger of succumbing to a tidal wave of online infringement. Although
recognized by some courts as grounds for a claim of trademark infringement, the
phenomenon of initial interest confusion through the purchase of trademarked
keyword search terms seems to arouse little ire on the part of the consuming
public.95 Anecdotally speaking, I can relate that the vast majority of students in my
trademarks courses are unsympathetic to such claims. Meanwhile, rather than
expanding trademark holder rights, the most significant recent legislation involving
trademarks, the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, attempted to cabin the
dilution cause of action, limiting dilution protection to marks that were famous
among the general purchasing public and bolstering First Amendment and fair use
defenses.96 Recent Supreme Court cases concerning trademark rights have gone in
favor of defendant competitors, not those asserting rights in a mark.97 In sum, it
does not appear that the public or government representatives perceive a great
danger from internet-based counterfeiters. Without the presence of a perceived
catastrophic threat to trademark holder interests, there is little reason to adopt a
regime of expansive vicarious liability protection.
Why has the potential for online trademark infringement failed to capture public
attention? The answer may lie in the nature of the particular intellectual property
rights at issue and how they may be appropriated by others. As Laura Heymann
has noted: "Copyright law controls distribution of the material qua material;
93. See LAWRENCE LEssIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 62-79 (2004); Brooks Boliek, H'wood Steps Up
Antipiracy Fight, HOLLYWOOD REP., July 23, 2003, at 1; Trent Seltzer, RIAA, MPAA, and the Digital
Piracy Issue: Comparing Public Relations Strategies and Effectiveness (May 26, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p14465_index.html) (describing educational
outreach and consumer awareness initiatives of MPAA).
94. See Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No
110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (2008).
95. When the state of Utah enacted a law specifically preventing the sale of trademarked keyword
search terms, protests from search engines and a concerned public convinced the legislature to repeal the
law only one year later. See Mary Candice Barrett, Note, State Regulation of Keyword Advertising: A
Lesson from the Utah Legislature, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 281, 283-84 (2008).
96. See Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1157 (2006).
97. See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004)
(holding that absence of likelihood of confusion is not required for party asserting trademark
infringement fair use defense); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003)
(ruling that the Lanham Act could not be used to remedy the failure to attribute the source of a creative
product whose copyright had passed into the public domain); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers,
Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (holding that product design is only protectable under the Lanham Act upon a
showing of secondary meaning).
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trademark law controls how the source of that material is presented to the public." 98
This may have some bearing on the relative lack of concern regarding those who
facilitate online infringement of trademarks. Digital technology permits infringers
to perfectly replicate a copyrighted item, in effect, removing all control over
distribution of that expressive product from the hands of the copyright owners. On
the surface, it seems reasonable to believe such technology places any business
model relying on control over the distribution of copyrighted works in jeopardy. 99
In contrast, the digital revolution does not offer a way for trademark infringers to
perfectly replicate most trademarked products. 10 0 Rather, such technology only
provides a means for altering the mark holder's ability to shape the public's
associations between its mark and the mark's larger meaning.' 0' While such
conduct may be threatening, by not engaging in the wholesale appropriation of the
trademark holder's product, the online direct trademark infringer's threat seems
relatively less grave and, by extension, the threat posed by those related in some
fashion to the direct trademark infringer seems less grave as well.
Of course, both trademarks and copyrighted works are examples of nonrivalrous
goods. When I make an unauthorized copy of the latest Lil Wayne album, I have
not deprived anyone of their own physical copy of the album. Similarly, if I use
the Kodak mark on my own product, I have not stopped the Eastman-Kodak
Company from continuing to use that same mark on all of its packaging. Thus,
copyright infringers are no more taking the "entire product" than trademark
infringers. Nevertheless, there may be a difference in how the public conceives of
infringement that involves a complete copy of the original item of value and
infringement that only involves appropriation of a brand name but not the
underlying good. Copyright interests have done their best to encourage a view of
copyrightable material as in limited supply. 102 They have been adamant that digital
copying is "stealing" and "piracy," drawing a parallel to thefts of physical property
that do represent appropriations of the "entire product." Trademark infringers, on
the other hand, are only taking someone else's brand name, an important consumer
signaling tool, but not something the public believes represents the entire value of
the mark holder's goods or services.
Such an explanation for the vicarious liability divide is not completely
satisfying. At times, the public does take the threat posed by trademark infringers
seriously. Congress recently passed legislation that not only enhanced the penalties
98. Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. REV. 55, 77 (2007).
99. Some disagree as to the gravity of the threat posed by online infringers to copyright interests.
See, e.g., Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Stumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An
Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1 (2007) (determining that file sharing does not reduce record
sales).
100. One exception might be trademarked "virtual" products offered for sale in online worlds like
Second Life and World of Warcraft. See generally Mark Bartholomew, Advertising in the Garden of
Eden, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 737 (2007); Candidus Dougherty & Greg Lastowka, Virtual Trademarks, 24
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 749 (2008).
101. See Heymann, supra note 98, at 100.
102. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX 34 (2008).
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for copyright infringement, but for trademark infringement as well. 10 3 President
Bush attempted to link counterfeiting to the war on terror. 104 In general, the story
of trademark law in this century has been one of expanding mark holder rights. 
105
Moreover, at the same time, continued mass infringement via peer-to-peer file
sharing and other technologies suggest a general lack of sympathy for copyright
holders.10 6  One potential inference from the ubiquity of blatant copyright
infringement in our daily lives is that most of us do not believe that copyright
holders are threatened by direct infringement. Without perceiving a true threat to
the copyright interests, the public is likely to be hostile to efforts to shift their
losses to vicarious infringers. Therefore, it is not clear that the divergence in
vicarious infringement doctrine can be explained solely by public sentiment that
copyright holders in the digital age are in danger but trademark holders are not.
Nevertheless, there does seem to be a distinction in how the copyright interests
have tried to demonstrate a crisis for their industry from the actions of
intermediaries and the failure of trademark interests to do so. Vicarious liability
operates as a mechanism for shifting risk. Before it will be endorsed by legal
decision-makers, there must be some perception that an intolerable amount of risk
exists.
B. CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
While vicarious liability exists to redistribute risk in the absence of fault,
contributory liability seeks to apportion liability on the basis of moral dessert.
Unlike vicarious infringement, contributory infringement demands proof of a
culpable mental state before liability will attach. In some fashion, the contributory
defendant must know of the illegal activity of another in order to be liable. In tort,
the question has typically been whether a reasonable person, standing in the shoes
of the defendant, would have been aware of the misdeeds of another. This
culpability requirement signals a concern with making actionable only that conduct
that is deemed blameworthy, separate and apart from concerns over the
consequences of the contributory defendant's behavior. 107
If anything, the Grokster decision has reinforced this concern with
blameworthiness, at least for contributory copyright infringement.10 8 Grokster
103. See Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L.
110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (2008).
104. See Fact Sheet: Protecting American Innovation (Oct. 13, 2008), available at http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081013-7.html ("Terrorist networks
use counterfeit sales to finance their operations.").
105. See Greg Lastowka, Google's Law, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 1327, 1366 (2008); Mark P.
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1839, 1896 (2007).
106. See Tehranian, supra note 92, at 537, 543-48; Jyh-Shen Chiou et al., The Antecedents of
Music Piracy: Attitudes and Intentions, 57 J. BUS. ETHICS 161, 161 (2005).
107. The knowledge requirement can be interpreted in various ways. One might also argue that
knowledge of the infringing activity is required if contributory liability is meant to deter facilitation of
such conduct in the future. See Emily Zarins, Comment, Notice Versus Knowledge Under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act's Safe Harbors, 92 CAL. L. REv. 257, 290 (2004).
108. See Yen, supra note 1, at 229 (emphasizing "Grokster's reliance on fault" instead of strict
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created a new type of contributory infringement, inducement infringement, that
places even greater emphasis on identifying a culpable mental state on the part of
the contributory defendant than does typical contributory infringement law. The
Grokster decision left unclear what sort of contribution requirement, in addition to
proof of intent to cause infringement, is required for liability. The decision did
make clear, however, that there was no need for a court to engage in a weighing of
the costs and benefits of imposing liability on a defendant that satisfies the standard
for inducement liability. While most contributory copyright defendants can
potentially take advantage of a safe harbor for the supply of a technology that is
capable of substantial noninfringing uses, Grokster holds that such a safe harbor is
not available upon a finding of an intent to induce infringement. 109
The question here becomes, therefore, why courts seem to believe that
contributory copyright infringement is more worthy of moral opprobrium than
contributory trademark infringement. The answer may lie in the nature of the
disputes at issue and the parties responsible for bringing them to the courts'
attention. The copyright interests have devoted tremendous resources to anti-
infringement litigation, garnering significant legal victories against technological
intermediaries, particularly file sharing networks.ll 0 By presenting certain select
defendants to courts for determination of path-breaking claims of contributory
infringement, the copyright interests won generous precedents that expanded the
scope of contributory copyright law."' Since the 1984 Sony decision, a defeat for
copyright interests, the entertainment industry has been able to implement a
litigation strategy that makes the most of relatively unsympathetic defendants like
the Napster and Grokster file sharing services. Napster's nineteen-year-old
cofounder was caught red handed, stressing to his employees "the need to remain
ignorant of users' real names and IP addresses 'since they are exchanging pirated
music."'' 112 In Grokster, the defendant's emails demonstrated an "unequivocal"
intent to cause others to break the law."13 In the Supreme Court's view, Napster
was "notorious" and Grokster, by unambiguously trying to emulate Napster and
encourage others to infringe, was equally wrong. 114 When these entities are viewed
as the face of secondary copyright infringement, there is little discomfort in
liability).
109. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913, 934-37 (2005). Whether
or not judges are making use of the safe harbor for substantial noninfringing uses is another question.
See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright Liability's
Continuing Tort Framework and Sony's De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L. REv. 143, 173-87 (2007).
110. See Peter K. Yu, Escalating the Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 907, 913 (2004).
111. See Pamela Samuelson, Three Reactions to MGM v. Grokster, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 177, 195 (2006) (noting that the entertainment industry has been selective in which peer-
to-peer file sharing services it targeted with litigation); see also Alfred C. Yen, Torts and the
Construction of Inducement and Contributory Liability in Amazon and Visa, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
513 (describing history of contributory copyright infringement lawsuits against an expanding list of
online intermediaries).
112. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001).
113. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 938.
114. Id.at924.
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imposing liability. 115
There has been no similar attempt to create an overarching trademark litigation
strategy to beat back the tide of online infringement. In coordinating a unified
litigation scheme to advance copyright protection, copyright owners could rely on
well-funded and well-organized trade organizations like the RIAA and MPAA.' 16
No such organization exists for trademark holders. The International Trademark
Association, formerly the United States Trademark Association, and the
Association of National Advertisers lobby Congress for changes in trademark law
and sometimes submit amicus briefs in cases involving important trademark issues.
But they lack the financial might and delegated authority of the entertainment
industry's trade associations, which have the ability to initiate litigation. Moreover,
while a great deal of valuable music and motion picture copyrights are consolidated
in a handful of movie studio and record companies, 117 trademark rights are
relatively atomized. They are held by virtually every successful business, and there
is no trade organization vested with discretion to prosecute the mark holders'
collective legal interests. The result is a relatively scattershot legal strategy for
mark holders. Perhaps as a result, there is no real face of secondary trademark
infringement. 8
IV. CONCLUSION
The divergence in the secondary liability regimes for copyright and trademark
shows little sign of abating. Since the Grokster decision issued in 2005, vicarious
infringement continues to be interpreted in a manner that is more generous to
copyright plaintiffs. But there are signs in the case law that vicarious infringement
may no longer even be a realistic cause of action for trademark holders. At the
same time, courts continue to hold online intermediaries liable for contributory
copyright infringement with showings of knowledge that would not suffice for
contributory trademark infringement claims. And the material contribution
standard is scrutinized more narrowly for trademark defendants, with fewer
115. See generally Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337 (2002)
(describing the litigation strategy of "content owners" and its deleterious impact on copyright law).
116. See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 31 (2d ed.
2006) (describing the "large budgets and considerable clout" of the trade associations representing the
core copyright industries); RIAA, Piracy: Online and On the Street,
http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) (describing RIAA's strategy to
bring infringement claims on behalf of its members); MPAA, Legal Cases,
http://www.mpaa.org/NewsStand Legal.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) ("One of MPAA's top priorities
is to protect the copyrights held by its member companies. This frequently involves litigation against
persons who have violated our members' copyrights or have assisted others to violate those rights.").
117. The membership of the RIAA creates, manufactures, or distributes the overwhelming
majority of the audio recordings produced and sold in this country. See RIAA, Who We Are,
http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
118. The last Supreme Court pronouncement on secondary trademark liability came in 1982. The
defendant in that case was a generic drug manufacturer, not exactly a candidate for demonization. See
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). In fact, the same year as the Ives decision,
Congress passed legislation to help generic drug manufacturers. See Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
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relationships deemed subject to contributory liability.
This Article speculates that the dichotomy in secondary infringement law
developed for reasons that are not legally sound. Differential treatment of
secondary trademark and copyright defendants should be based on more principled
criteria than which intellectual property interest group has the more savvy public
relations campaign or litigation strategy. Perhaps there is a more logical reason for
the secondary liability divide, but it remains unspoken. Courts need to be urged to
examine the reasons behind such differential treatment and to articulate a
compelling rationale for the divergence.
Judges sometimes explain their secondary liability decisions by reference to
common law tort principles. Further exploration of these principles may be useful
in evaluating secondary infringement. For example, such exploration could
reinforce the principle that vicarious infringement law should address questions of
socially necessary risk-shifting and not issues of personal blame or fault. I do not
think, however, that the answer to the divergence in secondary infringement law is
as simple as telling the courts to go back and study more intently the common law
rules of indirect liability. Advising courts to "follow the common law" when it
comes to secondary liability is a bit like telling them to "do it the right way"
without explaining what the right way is. The problem is not that courts have
failed to study the common law in enough detail. In part, the judicial freedom
provided by the amorphous contours of common law indirect liability is what got
us into this mess in the first place. 119
Tort law is a broad area of legal doctrine containing all sorts of complex and
contradictory principles. The law of tortious contributory liability is notoriously
ambiguous. Civil aiding and abetting law is the body of tort doctrine most closely
analogous to contributory infringement law in that it requires knowledge of tortious
conduct and a significant contribution to the conduct for liability to attach. 2 0 Yet
the content of these requirements remains so unpredictable, despite their existence
in American law for decades, that they offer little guidance for courts seeking a
philosophical grounding for their secondary infringement decisions. 121
Other potential sources of tort doctrine are similarly lacking in predictable
content. One might be inclined to urge intellectual property courts to apply
traditional notions of "proximate cause" to determine when one party should be
held accountable for the infringing acts of another. But, like aiding and abetting,
proximate cause is a difficult concept to pin down.122 It is sometimes described as
119. See Litman, supra note 115, at 365.
120. See Taylor v. Airco, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 432, 447-48 (D. Mass. 2007); see also S.E.C. v.
Johnson, 530 F. Supp. 2d 315, 322 (D.D.C. 2008) (setting out requirements for aiding and abetting
securities fraud).
121. One commentator describes the current state of civil aiding and abetting law as one of
"[g]eneral confusion." Nathan Isaac Combs, Note, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 VAND. L.
REv. 241, 255 (2005). Courts themselves have expressed frustration at the undeveloped nature of the
doctrine. See, e.g., Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
122. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 45, at 311-12 (1941) (noting
the degree of attention, and confusion, surrounding proximate cause doctrine); Mark F. Grady,
Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REv. 293, 294 (2002) ("[M]any believe that proximate cause is
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an analysis of foreseeability.' 23 Foreseeability, however, is an amorphous concept
itself with little predictive force for courts or potential defendants. 124 Proximate
cause may also be read to incorporate a host of other considerations besides
foreseeability, such as whether the defendant's action immediately preceded the
injury at issue or whether the injury was "dependent" on the defendant's action, but
these are vague concepts as well. 125 Hence, some argue that reliance on proximate
cause principles is really a doctrinal smokescreen for using ad hoc public policy
justifications to determine whether the material contribution standard has been
satisfied. 126  Thus, calling for the use of "proximate cause" principles in
contributory infringement disputes seems like a mistake. Particularly in a field like
intellectual property, where public policy concerns often guide judicial analysis, it
seems better to address such policy-based concerns head on instead of hiding
behind legal terminology devoid of real content. 127
Moreover, some aspects of common law tort doctrine would be
counterproductive if applied to the specialized context of intellectual property law.
Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein have recently demonstrated that tort law
operates in a fundamentally conservative manner. 128  For example, in assessing
fault, courts look to a backdrop of accepted custom. Departures from the backdrop
usually result in liability. 129 Because secondary infringement law often involves
issues stemming from the introduction of new technologies, application of these
principles would retard modernization, something that legal theorists generally say
the law of secondary infringement must guard against.' 
30
Before applying common law principles to questions of secondary infringement,
we need to perform a more thorough examination of the "wrongs" involved in
facilitating nonrivalrous consumption. Given Grokster's emphasis on the
culpability of secondary defendants and the decline in the vicarious trademark
infringement cause of action, we may be witnessing a judicial shift to greater
emphasis on the contributory, rather than the vicarious, cause of action for
basically incoherent, that its cases cannot be predicted, and even that they illustrate some fundamental
disorder of the common law.").
123. See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1012 (7th Cir. 2002); Mo. Pac. R.R. Co.
v. Am. Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1977).
124. See W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 740 (2005) ("For
those responsible for understanding tort doctrine, the concept of foreseeability is a scourge, and its role
in negligence cases is a vexing, crisscrossed morass.").
125. See Joseph Lavitt, The Doctrine of Efficient Proximate Cause, The Katrina Disaster,
Prosser's Folly, and the Third Restatement of Torts: Cracking the Conundrum, 54 LOYOLA L. REV. 1,
12-18 (2008).
126. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 101-02
(expanded ed. 2003).
127. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on the Patterns of Negligence, 53 LA. L. REV. 1509,
1523 (1993) ("[J]udges should not rely on, or hide behind, words like.., foreseeable, unforeseeable ....
and whatever other magic mumbo jumbo courts could use to obfuscate the policies that were really at
the heart of their decisions.").
128. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285 (2008).
129. See id. at 290-98.
130. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2004).
2009]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [32:4
secondary infringement. This would suggest a trend towards greater concern with
fault-based reasons for holding indirect infringers liable.t3  What seems to be
going on in secondary infringement law is an unarticulated sense that aiding
copyright infringement is more dangerous, more blameworthy, more wrong than
facilitating trademark infringement. There is no reason why this difference needs
to remain in the shadows. In fact, by leaving it unsaid, courts unnecessarily add to
the opaque quality of an area of law that is already overly vague and threatening to
innovation.
131. This may be a good thing. Vicarious infringement liability requires an analysis of the
potential impact on the market for the plaintiff's intellectual property from the vicarious defendant's
business model. Often these business models involve new technologies like search engines and peer-to-
peer file sharing platforms. Hindsight tells us that it is notoriously difficult to predict the impact of
infringing technology. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429-31
(1984) (advocating judicial deference to Congress in refashioning copyright law to address new
technologies). Limiting secondary liability to questions of personal culpability and fault keeps judges
out of the business of forecasting technological and economic likelihoods. It also retrains judicial
attention towards concepts regularly applied in other areas of the law.
